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The Political Economic Origins of Reali-TV 
Chad Raphael 
From the sea change in American television in the 19~os emerged a pro-
gramming trend variously described as "infotainment;' "reality-based 
television;' "tabloid TV:' "crime-time television;' "trash TV:' and "on -scene 
shows:' The welter of terms created by television critics to describe these 
new programs masked their underlying connection as a response to eco-
nomic restructuring within the industry. In this essay I offer a rough cat-
egorization of these programs, sketch the industrial context from which 
they emerged, and point to the economic problems they were meant to 
solve. I focus mostly on the distinctive conditions of prime-time series, 
putting aside made-for-TV docudramas and entire cable channels (such 
as Court TV) that may have similar production practices and genres. 
Although my focus here is on political economy, rather than on textual 
or audience issues, I do not want to imply that these programs' cultural 
significance can be reduced to their relations of production and distri-
bution. Yet without understanding the political and economic forces that 
drove the spread of this genre, textual and audience studies may risk rei-
fying it as an expression of audience demand; or of their creators; or of 
a cultural, discursive, or ontological shift unrelated to the needs of those 
who run the television industry. If this genre exhibits a kind of textual 
excess, its emergence reflects a relative scarcity of resources for television 
production. 
Among the swirl of neologisms, my preferred term for these programs 
is "Reali-TV," which points to the inseparability of the television indus-
try's economic needs and how this genre represents reality.1 This term 
stresses television's particular reasons for embracing reality shows, as op-
posed to claims about the spread of infotainment across the media. At 
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the same time, this designation illuminates connections between seem-
ingly different television programs (such as crime-time, tabloid TV, and 
on-scene shows) and avoids the high cultural bias implicit in the notion 
of trash TV. The term indicates not only how these programs make dis-
tinctive claims to represent the real but also their common impact on the 
realities of power and economic relations in the industry. Reali-TV, then, 
is an umbrella term for a number of programming trends that have rap-
idly expanded since the late 198os across all hours of network schedules, 
first- run syndication, and cable. 
Production practices common to most of these programs include ex-
tensive use of ((actuality" footage of their subjects, whether these are po-
lice staking out a drug den or mom and dad yukking it up in front of the 
camcorder; reenactments of events, performed by professional actors, or 
by the people who experienced them, or a mix of both; a tendency to 
avoid the studio in favor of on-scene shooting, sometimes at the same 
place where the events they represent occurred; mixing footage shot by 
unpaid amateur videographers with that of professionals; appealing to the 
conventions of ((liveness:' and ((immediacy" through on-location inter-
views, subjective camera work, and synchronized sound; and appropriat-
ing traditional conventions of news coverage, such as the use of anchors 
or hosts, remote reporting, and the pretense to ((spontaneity:' Studio-
centered formats, principally game shows and confessional talk program-
ming, are the obvious exceptions to these common practices. 
These production techniques are combined differently in numerous 
Reali-TV formats, which can be distinguished according to how much 
, each relies on nontraditional labor (for story development, writing, per-
forming, and camerawork) and production inputs (such as sets, props, 
and costumes.) Some formats continue to depend mainly on professional 
labor and traditional inputs. The network newsm~gazines-whose ranks 
have swollen in the past few years with the introduction of 48 Hours and 
Street Stories (CBS), Primetime Live (ABC), Dateline NBC, and others-are 
still entirely professionally produced and employ the same mix of studio 
and location footage as the evening news. The same is true of tabloid TV 
shows (such as the syndicated A Current Affair or Entertainment Tonight), 
despite their unique representational strategies. 
Several other Reali-TV formats use -hybrid production techniques. 
Hidden-video programs (such as Totally Hidden Video), which enjoyed a 
minor resurgence in the early 1990s, rely on professional camera crews 
and actors maneuvering nonprofessional performers into embarrassing 
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or humorous situations. So do experiment-based programs that place and 
observe nonactors in contrived living arrangements (The Real World) and 
increasingly add the element of competition for money and prizes (as in 
Survivor and Fear Factor). Crime-time and emergency response programs 
(Rescue 911, America's Most Wanted, Unsolved Mysteries, and the many 
imitators these shows have spawned on cable and first-run syndication) 
are shot and edited by professionals and introduced by a regular host. Yet 
they also may employ some amateur footage of disasters, as well as non-
professional performers enacting their own rescues or crime experiences. 
These programs also take advantage of props, sets, and costumes provided 
by law enforcement authorities, corrections institutions, parole boards, 
and emergency medical crews. Clip shows (such as The World's Wildest 
Police Videos and other "World's Best/Worst/Most" programs) similarly 
mix amateur and professional video. Finally, home video programs (such 
as America's Funniest Home Videos) rely entirely on amateur footage that 
is professionally edited. This format depends most heavily on nontradi-
tional inputs and labor, not only for "scripting;' performing, and shooting 
the hijinks but also to do the work of studio audiences (who vote for the 
funniest video, for example). Before discussing how these techniques have 
lowered production costs, we need to examine the larger economic pic-
ture from whence they sprang. 
Decline of the Networks: Webs Wane as Competition Climbs 
As a fiscal strategy, Reali-TV emerged in the late 198os in response to the 
economic restructuring of U.S. television. Much of the restructuring story 
has been told by scholars and in the trade press: how the number of video 
distribution channels expanded rapidly, with the growth of cable, VCRs, 
the FOX network, and local independent stations; how the television au-
dience was increasingly fragmented; how advertising revenues now had 
to be spread among a larger pool of distributors; and how this dilution 
of advertising spending created pressure on broadcasters and cablecast-
ers to cut per-program production costs.2 Less cited causes for production 
budget cuts included the high levels of corporate debt incurred by the big 
three networks after each was sold in the mid-198os and advertiser-driven 
changes in audience-measurement techniques designed to identify spe-
cific market segments (the most notorious of these was the People-Meter, 
which yielded dramatically lower ratings for the networks).3 
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By the late 198os, then, the economic picture of American television 
had become decidedly more crowded. If the networks remained in the 
foreground as the major economic force in the industry, the purveyors 
of cable, VCRs, and first-run syndication winked and beckoned viewers 
in the background. Advertisers and audience-measurement services bus-
ily tried to record who was watching what, how much attention they paid 
to the commercial breaks, and whether they were buying any of it. But 
to understand how Reali-TV emerged as a cost-cutting solution in this 
new economic environment of the late 1980s, we need to examine how 
increased competition in the distribution of television programming af-
fected the sphere of production. 
1he Squeeze on Production: 
Ouch! Webs and Suppliers Feel the Pinch 
As television distributors fought over smaller advertising shares and 
shouldered more debt, program producers (network production arms, 
major Hol~ywood studios, and the few small independent production 
companies) all faced rapidly rising costs in the 1980s. For prime-time pro-
ducers, the average cost of an hour ·drama soared to over $1 million· per 
episode by the end of the decade, and costs were increasing by roughly 8 
to 10 percent a year.4 Prices were driven up primarily by ((above the line" 
costs such as talent, direction, scriptwriting, music composition, com-
puter animation, and location costs.5 The star system for above-the-line 
labor became especially pronounced, as network programmers, agent-
packagers, and production companies responded to .the greater risks of 
capital involved in the creation of new shows by increasingly demanding 
names associated with a prior record of success. Greater demand for stars 
created an artificial labor shortage and inflated salaries for the lucky few. 
These rising costs were accompanied by smaller per-show revenues, 
creating a squeeze on production companies' earnings from both sides of 
the ledger. Producers now had to accept smaller license fees for their pro-
grams than they had commanded from the networks before the new era 
of competition. The threatened networks were scaling back outlays, and 
cable network distributors and syndicators also lacked deep pockets for 
program purchases. In addition, changes in federal tax laws eliminated 
producers' investment tax credits, which often meant the difference be-
tween earning a profit and taking a loss on a program. Before the 1986 
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restructuring of federal tax laws, producers were able to deduct 6.7 per-
cent of the cost of their productions from their federal tax bills. By the 
mid-198os, caught between rising costs and lower network license fees, 
most producers could no longer make back their investments in first-run 
network showings. By 1986, producers were losing up to $10o,ooo per 
episode for half-hour shows and $2oo,ooo to $3oo,ooo for hour dramas.6 
Producers now were forced to deficit-finance their programs and cross 
their fingers in hopes the show would survive three network seasons, 
providing enough episodes for domestic and foreign syndication and a 
chance to recoup their initial investments. 
Producers to Labor: Drop Dead 
Feeling the squeeze on profits, production companies and the networks 
initiated a series of cost -cutting strategies that translated into an attack on 
labor, mainly on below-the-line workers such as technicians, engineers, 
and extras.? The first move was a wave of staff cutbacks at studios and 
network news departments. In the mid-198os, FOX cut 20 percent of its 
studio staff, Capital Cities/ ABC cut 10 percent of its staff, and CBS cut 
30 percent of its administrative staff and 10 percent of its news division. 
NBC resisted a 17-week strike by the National Association of Broadcast 
Employees and Technicians (NABET) in 1987, shedding 200 union jobs. 
By 1992, NBC had eliminated 30 percent of its news division through lay-
offs and bureau closings. Even network standards and practices depart-
ments, the, much-derided self-censors of the broadcasting industry, faced 
the budg~t-cutting ax. 
The second part of the cost-cutting strategy involved bypassing union 
labor, spurring an unprecedented wave of strikes by above-line and be-
low-line labor unions and craft guilds. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
NABET, the Directors Guild, the American Federation of Musicians 
(AFM), the Screen Extras Guild (SEG), and the American Federation of 
Radio and Television Artists (AFTRA) all struck, while the Screen Actors 
Guild (SAG) struck twice and the Writers Guild three times. Above-the-
line workers especially sought more residuals for the use of programs on 
new media and overseas. Lower-paid labor, such as members of the SEG, 
took a more defensive stand commensurate with their weaker bargaining 
power. The SEG strike ended with union members accepting a 25 percent 
wage cut, changes in overtime schedules, and the acceptance of producers' 
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prerogative to hire more nonunion labor (the extras, bargaining position 
was hurt by SAG,s refusal to merge with the less-powerful union or even 
to support its position in contract negotiations). 
This increase in labor unrest was both a response to and a motivating 
force in attempts to break the power of the unions. As a result, producers 
~xacerbated the long-term split in the Hollywood labor market between 
core workers (such as the successful SAG members who enjoy higher pay 
and more job security and who share management tasks and interests) 
and periphery workers (such as the SEG members, who have little job se-
curity, work part-time schedules, and endure far lower wages).8 
Producers also responded to union demands by using nonunion Hol-
lywood labor and shifting production to regions where cheaper labor 
was available, such as Canada and the ((right-to-work, states of the U.S. 
South. These tactics cut across entertainment and news program pro-
duction. Disney and MCA led the industry shift toward building studio 
complexes in Florida. The loss of the investment tax credit, which was 
only applicable to programs produced in the United States, helped spur a 
shift of production to Canada, where lower costs and more pliable unions 
could save $2oo,ooo to $3oo,ooo an episode for dramatic series.9 In news 
programming, CNN and FOX led the way in producing with lower-paid, 
nonunion labor and by breaking down job classifications. Their "success, 
was increasingly imitated by the traditional networks. One former CBS 
executive noted that the lesson of CNN was ((Break the unions!,10 NBC 
appears to have the learned the lesson quickest, developing a 24-hour af-
filiate news service based in Charlotte, North Carolina, staffed with non-
union labor. Some FOX affiliates experimented with subcontracting their 
entire evening newscasts. 
Survivor Economics: Reali-TV Fits the Bill 
Reali-TV shows gained currency in this environment of relative finan-
cial scarcity and labor unrest of the late 198os. Economically, the genre fit 
the needs of producers and distributors alike for cheaper programming. 
These programs largely did away with higher-priced stars and union tal-
ent. In the early days, the only ((name, actors on these shows were briefly 
seen as hosts. 
More recently, a subgenre has developed that trots out minor celebri-
ties and has-beens that come cheap to endure humiliating tests of their 
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mettle, fighting each other in Celebrity Boxing or plunging themselves 
in vermin in Celebrity Fear Factor. In the crime-time/emergency shows, 
roles in reenactments of crimes and rescues have been filled by unknown 
actors and, sometimes, by the people on which the stories were based. 
In programs such as Cops, segments followed law 'enforcement officials in 
the course of their work, eschewing reenactments and the need for actors 
entirely. The home video and hidden-video programs likewise avoided 
professional union talent, as have mor~ recent experiment-based shows. 
In bypassing more-expensive performers, program producers also escaped 
the grips of the Hollywood agents, who had come to occupy the role of 
program developers and packagers in the early 1980s, and who exacted 
considerable fees for their services.11 
Producers of Reali-TV, particularly of the crime-time/ emergency 
shows and home and hidden-video programs, led a wider industry move 
toward using nonunion, freelance production crews. The Arthur Co. of-
fers a good example. In 1987 it lost the rights to produce the network 
prime-time drama Airwolf, after battling with the Writers Guild over ca-
ble royalties, then turned to producing low-budget, nonunion programs 
for syndication and basic cable. In 1991 Arthur Co. returned to prime 
time with FBI: The Untold Stories, a Reali~ TV reprise of the bureau's long-
running romance with the tube. Similarly, FOX's America's Most Wanted, 
one of the trendsetters of Reali-TV when it premiered in 1987, used differ-
ent freelance crews for each segment. Even some newsmagazines, such as 
CBS Street Stories, turned to freelance camera crews and news producers. 
The home video programs relied on amateur camcorder enthusiasts and 
freelance professionals. Reali-TV producers also partook of the move to 
cheaper labor regions. Grosso-Jacobson Entertainment, a prolific creator 
of crime-time· shows (including Top Cops, True Blue, and Secret Service), 
shot its patriotic paeans to Americas law enforcers in Toront0.12 
The genre has also been an integral part of network strategies to con-
trol labor unrest. The 1988 Writers' Strike, a 22-week affair that delayed 
the opening of the fall season, proved crucial to the rise of Reali-TV. Ex-
isting Reali-TV shows were largely unaffected by the strike, as they al-
ready relied very little on writers. In addition, the delay of the season 
gave producers and programmers ·the impetus to develop future shows 
that did not depend on writing talent. Tabloid TV pioneer Peter Brennan 
(of Hard Copy), when asked whether he was concerned about a potential 
SAG strike in 1992, shrugged off the threat: ((Remember the Writers Guild 
strike in '88? . . . That was the year. that gave rise to reality TV."13 
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The second wave of Reali-TV programming, ushered in by the ratings 
success of the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire' in 1999 and Sur-
vivor in 2000, carne amid threatened walkouts by writers and actors. The 
networks ordered more Reali-TV series in part to prepare for potential 
strikes and not simply because they could be produced without union 
employees. Reality series can be developed more quickly than fictional 
programs partly because they do not rely on lining up talent and writers. 
Newsmagazines can be expanded relatively easily to fill additional hours 
on the network schedule because news workers are typically affiliated with 
different unions than other television talent. "There is a quick turnaround 
time with reality:' noted CBS President Leslie Moonves in detailing his 
network's plans for a possible writers' strike in 2001/4 
Reali-TV programs also cut costs by wholeheartedly embracing low-
end production values. Direct cinema techniques such as handheld cam-
eras and the use of available lighting made shows without reenactments 
(such as Cops and the network newsmagazines) particularly cheap. Pro-
grams that employed reenacted material (such as Rescue 911 and Unsolved 
Mysteries) often avoided traditionally painstaking lighting and makeup 
to approximate the "real" look of direct cinema footage and its relatively 
low production costs. Although reenactments required some expenses for 
on-location shooting, going on-scene was often less costly than renting 
studio space. In addition, crime-time and emergency shows minimized 
costs of sets, props, and costumes by convincing the agencies they profile 
to donate police cars, equipment, and even uniforms for the production 
crew, so they could pass for police at crime scenes.15 F~nally, research and 
logistical costs for most categories of Reali-TV shows are tempered by the 
information subsidies traditionally extended to the news and entertain-
ment media by public relations operatives hoping to plant favorable sto-
ries about their corporate and government clients.16 
As a result of their shoestring production budgets, prime-time Re-
ali-TV shows cut production costs dramatically and recouped their 
makers' investments from network license fees alone. With rare excep-
tions, Reali-TV was the only category of prime-time programming that 
was not deficit-financed in the early 1990s (table 6.1 lists production 
costs for a representative season). In the same year, one-hour dramas 
and 30-rninute sitcoms often lost $1oo,ooo to $3oo,ooo an episode. At 
a time when dramas routinely cost over $1 million per episode, and 
half-hour sitcoms cost $5oo,ooo to $6oo,ooo apiece, Reali-TV pro-
grams offered considerable savings in production costs, sometimes 
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TABLE 6.1 
Prime-Time Reali-TV Programs at the Start of the 1991-1992 Season 
License Fee 
Program Network Minutes Producers Deficit per Episode 
America's Funniest ABC 30 ABC/Vin di Bona $0 $375,000 
Home Videos 
America's Funniest ABC 30 ABC/Vin di Bona $0 $300,000 
People 
American Detective ABC 30 ABC/Orion TV I $0 $450,000 
Paul Stojanovich 
FBI: The Untold Series ABC 6o The Arthur Company $25,000 $450, 000 
Primetime Live ABC 60 ABC News $0 $500,000 
20/20 ABC 6o ABC News $0 $500,000 
48 Hours CBS 60 CBS News $0 $500,000 
Rescue 911 CBS 30 CBS/ Arnold Shapiro $0 $650,000 
6o Minutes CBS 6o CBS News $0 $600,000 
Top Cops CBS 6o CBS News $0 $650,000 
Expose NBC 30 NBC News $0 $300,000 
Real Life with NBC 30 NBC News $0 $300,000 
jane Pauley 
Unsolved Mysteries NBC 6o Cosgrove-Meurer $0 $800,000 
America's Fox 60 STF Productions $0 $500,000 
Most Wanted 
Cops Fox 30 Barbour-Langley/ $0 $325,000 
Fox TV Stations 
Cops II Fox 30 Barbour-Langley/ $0 $325,000 
Fox TV Stations 
Totally New Fox 30 STF Productions $0 $500,000 
Totally Hidden 
Video 
Source: Variety, 26 August 1991, 48-54. 
over so percent compared with fictional programming.17 Reali-TV also 
enjoyed success in the low-fee first-run syndication and made-for-ca-
ble fields. 
Deregulation: Reali-TV Right for Finsyn, Public Service Fights 
A changing regulatory climate also contributed to the economic advan-
tages of Reali-TV. In 1970, amid concerns about network power over pro-
duction companies, the FCC barred the networks from owning a financial 
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interest in, and retaining syndication rights to, most prime-time entertain-
ment programming (daytime shows, sports, and news were not affected). 
The financial and syndication, or ((finsyn;' rules also limited the number 
of hours of prime-time shows the network could produce. A 1980 consent 
decree in an antitrust case further limited network prime-time entertain-
ment production to 2.5 hours per week for several years. 
When the FCC enacted the finsyn rules, its stated goals were to en-
courage local programming and small independent producers. The FCC 
hoped that if network production were reined in, other producers might 
create more innovative, diverse programming. But the small independents 
did not flourish, as the large capital investments and risks .required of pro-
gram producers meant that Hollywood studios with substantial financing 
still controlled the field. As with the small independents in the film indus-
try, televisions smaller production houses depended on winning network 
contracts for their programming before they could secure bank financ-
ing to make it.18 Independents did not exercise much financial or creative 
power over the development of new programming, especially when com-
pared with the major studios or the top agent-packagers. In many ways, 
the same relat~ons held in first-run syndication and the made-for-cable 
markets. Here, the small independents were often financed by large mul-
tisystem operators (such as AOL-Time Warner) and the dominant distri-
bution companies (including those run by major studios) in exchange for 
syndication rights. 
Throughout the 1980s, the networks challenged the finsyn rules, argu-
ing that they were no longer in a position to dominate program distri-
bution as they had before the spread of cable and VCRs, and that they 
needed to be allowed to compete internationally in the global television 
market. In April1991, the FCC allowed the networks to finance and syn-
dicate their own in-house or coproduced programs and to negotiate for 
the rights to some outside-produced shows. Hollywood studios and inde-
pendent producers exhausted a long series of appeals, and the finsyn rules 
were repealed in 1995. 
Although FOX has was exempt from the finsyn rules and always pro-
duced the bulk of its programmi~g in-house, the three major networks 
may very well have anticipated the repeal of these restrictions and posi-
tioned themselves to syndicate Reali-TV programming domestically and 
abroad.19 From the start, one of the striking characteristics of prime-time 
Reali-TV programs was that so many of them are network productions 
or coproductions (see table 6.1). This was true not only of the network 
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newsmagazines, which are produced by their news divisions, but also of 
crime-time/emergency response and the home video shows. As producers 
and coproducers of the shows, networks could retain the rights to distrib-
ute them under the new rules. 
Reali-TV has also played a role in the redefinition of p.ublic service 
programming. In the Reagan-Bush climate of lax regulation, program-
mers did not need to fear FCC scrutiny of the violence and sexual con-
tent of Reali-TV, avoiding the costs of in-house standards and practices 
departments' close screening of these programs, along with the potential 
legal costs of defending them before the FCC. 
In addition, many Reali-TV producers recast broadcasters' "public 
service" and "educational" responsibilities to champion the civic value of 
their programs. Producers ignored traditional definitions of serving the 
public interest, which focused more on the discussion of public affairs, 
coverage of local issues, and developing children's intellectual or emo-
tional abilities. Instead, the creators of crime-time programs in particular 
touted their public contribution as prompting citizens to help law enforce-
ment officers track down their quarry. The executive producer of Ameri-
cas Most Wanted opined to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin: "I believe 
we are witnessing the birth of a new era in citizen involvement. Americas 
Most Wanted has organized some 22 million viewers into the first nation-
wide neighborhood watch association:'2 o In this vision of public service, 
surveillance and voyeurism replace debate over public affairs, an oxymo-
ronic "nationwide neighborhood watch association' offers a false sense of 
localism, and education is reduced to instructing viewers about how to 
avoid becoming a crime victim. 
The more recent crop of Reali-TV game shows and survival contests 
make far less pretense to public service, except for the network news-
magazines. These programs still purport to offer investigative reporting 
even as they abandon the kinds of subjects most in need of journalistic 
scrutiny. A recent study of four network newsmagazines found that over 
one-half of all stories focused on lifestyle, human interest, and celebrity 
news. Just 8 percent of reports were about politics, economics, social wel-
fare and education.21 As the newsmagazines began to compete with fic-
tional and tabloid television programs, such as Entertainment Tonight or 
Inside Edition, all increasingly focused on the same topics. By 1997, there 
was little difference in story selection between the tabloid programs and 
the network newsmagazines, according to one television monitoring com-
pany. The runaway story of the year for both was Princess Diana's death. 22 
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International Distribution: The Other Real World 
Producers and network investors have also been attracted to Reali-TV 
because of its ability to sell abroad. Because prime-time Reali-TV earns 
back its production costs with the first U.S. network showing, any fur-
ther syndication represents pure profit. American Reali-TV has been sold 
overseas using two methods. Some shows are licensed outright to for-
eign broadcasters, the way most U.S. programming traditionally has been 
marketed. Episodes of the top-rated network crime-time/emergency pro-
grams Unsolved Mysteries and Rescue 911 have bee11 sold abroad in this 
manner. One international program distributor claims that ((the easiest 
and most profitable thing for a distributor to do with reality shows is to li-
cense them as they are. Prices can even approach what distributors get for 
action -adventure hours in some territories:'23 By 1991, Rescue 911 could be 
seen in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden; Unsolved Mysteries was avail-
able in Canada, Spain, France, and Japan. 
Many more shows have been formatted because of their topical or local 
nature, however. This method involves selling or licensing the program's 
concept for local production with local subjects. American program foot-
age may be sold as well to supplement the local version. ''In syndication;' 
notes one executive producer, ((shows tend to be more topical and current 
... but they have to be more timeless for that backend revenue"24 As Asu 
Aksoy and Kevin Robins note, the challenge for contemporary media dis-
tributors ''is to transcend vestigial national difference and to create stan-
dardized global markets, whilst remaining sensitive to the peculiarities of 
local markets and differentiated consumer segments:'25 
Reali-TV has participated in this ((glocalization" strategy. Fremantle, a 
distributor of game shows and Candid Camera, provides a good example 
of how formatting works. Fremantle's chief executive officer maintains 
that the company ((operates in foreign markets like McDonald's does .... 
There are Fremantle subsidiaries in some countries; in others there are 
franchise-holders who produce their own local versions of the original 
product:'26 
Home-video and hidden-video shows tend to be formatted rather than 
licensed, allowing foreign broadcasters to insert their own clips into the 
programs. Crime-time shows have also been formatted. The Swedes de-
veloped a version of Cops, and America's Most Wanted was transformed 
into the short-lived Australia's Most Wanted. Tabloid TV programs and 
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newsmagazines are especially likely to be formatted or customized be-
cause the appeal of their stories and journalists tends to be culturally spe-
cific. Newsmagazines, such as 6o Minutes, often export stories after strip-
ping them of their original graphics, voice-overs, journalists, and hosts 
so that local journalists can tailor the stories and insert themselves into 
them.27 
Reali-TV's growth abroad, especially in Europe, was aided by the wide-
spread movement to privatize and deregulate broadcasting. As one dis-
tributor put it in the early 1990s: 
With some exceptions, public service broadcasters have always kept a 
tight lid on the definition of reality. . . . The taste [for Reali-TV] has been 
stimulated abroad by increased commercialism, but reality shows haven't 
yet taken hold en masse . ... But because foreign broadcasters are tight for 
money, the attraction of reality will no doubt be considerable. 28 
Although both private and public broadcasters have purchased Reali-TV, 
the genre's growth was especially symptomatic of the need for European 
public broadcasters to operate according to the logic of private channels, 
as competition for audiences and funding mounted.29 
In addition, the explosion of distribution channels in the 198os was not 
only an American phenomenon but a global one. Thus, some of the same 
cost pressures encountered by U.S. producers were being felt abroad. To 
better adapt to an unevenly globalizing television market, some Reali-TV 
has been conceived for international audiences first. Time Warner/HBO's 
World Entertainment Report, for example, was prelicensed across Europe, 
Australia, and Japan. The program had a modular format that broadcast-
ers could recompose to fit their needs, inserting local entertainment cov-
erage if desired. 
The international spread of Reali-TV cannot be explained as the result 
of American product innovation because many European and Japanese 
programs predated their American counterparts. The top-rated American 
tabloid in the late 1980s and early 1990s, A Current Affair,, was developed 
_ in Australia. Crimewatch UK, which reconstructs crimes and asks for 
viewers' assistance, preceded America's Most Wanted and Unsolved Mys-
teries, as did a similar Dutch program. 
These transborder flows suggest that programs that appear to be prod-
ucts of rapid American innovation when glimpsed from the national per-
spective were actually the result of an increased international circulation, 
136 CHAD RAPHAEL 
and recirculation, of products through globalized media markets. For ex-
ample, the widely formatted America's Funniest Home Videos was itself in-
spired by segments of the Japanese variety show Fun Television with Kato-
chan and Ken-chan, which broadcast humorous videos sent in by viewers. 
King World's early 1990s revival of Candid Camera for foreign and domes-
tic syndication, an attempt to capitalize on the success of America's Fun-
niest Home Videos, similarly indicated that there was as much recycling of 
program formats as rapid innovation at work in the growth of Reali-TV. 
Mark Burnett, a former parachutist for the British Army and the creator 
of Survivor, based the program on Swedish and Dutch models.30 
If U.S. television has always mixed the shock of the new with the famil-
iarity of the formulaic, Reali~ TV's rise suggested that American producers 
looked further abroad for ((new, ideas, then· repackaged them for domes-
tic and international audiences. To the extent that the spread of the genre 
represented a ((victory" for U.S.-based media producers, it was largely a 
triumph of packaging and marketing. 
What Price Reality? 
American television underwent a dramatic restructuring in the 1980s, 
largely precipitated by changing patterns of distribution with the spread 
of cable and VCRs. Audiences fragmented as these new forces challenged 
the networks' oligopolistic control over the distribution of television pro-
gramming. Producers faced smaller license and syndication fees from an 
expanded customer base, which now included not only the networks but 
also local independent stations, cable networks and superstations, and 
first-run distributors. Confronted with rapidly rising above-the-line pro-
duction costs, producers took it out on below-the-line labor and sought 
cheaper forms of programming. Reali-TV fit the bill. 
In the early years, networks stepped in to produce examples of this pro-
gramming that were permissible according to the FCC (news magazines 
for the big three, and all forms for FOX) and coproduced the kinds they 
were not allowed to own and syndicate under the finsyn rules until the 
rules were repealed. Reali-TV made a splash in Europe and Japan in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s as well, but many American programs of this 
kind that were licensed and formatted abroad drew on foreign models in 
the first place. This suggests that if American television turned to Reali-
TV to solve its particular economic crisis, the industry both borrowed 
The Political Economic Origins of Reali-TV 137 
and exported abroad to do so, touching off a recirculation of products 
among global media corporations. 
But Reali-TV has not always solved the economic problems it was 
meant to address. The genre declined for several years in the mid-1990s 
for several reasons. First, Reali-TV was not always successful in off-net-
work syndication markets, as the genre's topicality and timeliness made it 
less attractive to audiences the second time around. Unsolved Mysteries, a 
top ratings winner in prime time, was one of the first such programs to 
be offered for syndication. Although it was sold to broadcast stations in 
reedited and often updated episodes, it was a financial disappointment to 
.its producers before it found a home on the Lifetime channel, a cable net-
work that could settle for smaller audiences. Similarly, reruns of the fi~st 
season of Survivor did not attract strong viewership. ((Reality shows have a 
short shelf life;' one programmer noted; ''they just don't seem to sell well 
in syndication:'31 
Under the old finsyn rules, when the networks could not take an own-
ership interest in most prime-time programs, executives did not have to 
worry about whether programs were attractive for syndication. Today, the 
networks produce and own most of their prime-time schedules, sharing 
the rewards but also the risks of investing in new shows. Thus far, the 
rewards have been few, as no network has produced a hit series that has 
sold well in syndication, although that is likely to change soon as the cur-
rent crop of hit programs reach maturity. 
Second, the genre's excesses drove away some advertisers that do not 
want to be associated with its tawdry image and generally lower-income 
audiences.32 There have been public embarrassments, most notoriously 
FOX's Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire, in which a man picked 
his bride from the so women who auditioned on television for the job. 
FOX had to cancel the rebroadcast after news reports aired allegations of 
abuse by the groom's former girlfriend, raised questions about whether 
he was indeed a multimillionaire, and exposed the bride's claims to be a 
Persian Gulf War veteran as misleading. The on-air wedding was quickly 
annulled. Even more scandalous from advertisers' point of view, much 
Reali-TV has failed to attract affluent 18 to 35 year olds, appealing more 
to preteens, seniors, and low-income viewers. This is especially true of 
the tabloid programs, crime-time, and emergency programs. There are 
exceptions that draw more upscale viewers, such as Survivor, or young 
consumers, such as The Real World, but the genre's demographics have 
sometimes forced the networks to sell advertising time on Reali-TV 
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shows at a discount compared with other programs with similar ratings 
and shares. 33 
Finally, a small legal backlash raised costs to some producers and lim-
ited their access to some of the most sensational types of footage.34 Pro-
grams that rely on producers' ability to ride along with police or emer-
gency workers and follow them into homes and ambulances have pro-
voked a rash of suits for invasion of privacy. In 1999, the Supreme Court 
ruled that it was a violation of Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable searches for media personnel to enter a home on the au-
thorities' coattails unless aiding in executing a warrant. This is unlikely 
to curb ride-alongs but should discourage media entries into suspects' 
homes without permission. I 
Some producers may be affected by antipaparazzi laws that sprang up 
in the wake of Princess Diana's death in a high-speed car accident while 
fleeing photographers. California's law, for example, criminalizes the use 
· of visually or aurally enhancing technology to capture sound and video in 
private places that would otherwise be inaccessible. The newsmagazines-
indeed, any show that relies on personnel going undercover or using de-
ception to get information-must take stock of the unsettled state of law in 
this area. 
Many journalists were chilled by a 1997 jury award of $5.5 million to su-
permarket giant Food Lion in its lawsuit against an ABC Primetime Live 
undercover report that portrayed unsafe food handling and labor condi-
tions at the chain. An appeals court later reduced the damages to $2 but up-
held convictions of ABC on two counts. The networks' journalists, who got 
jobs at several Food Lion stores so they could gather hidden-camera foot-
age behind the scenes, were found guilty of trespass and breach of loyalty 
(the latter charge was for gathering hidden-camera footage for the network 
while being paid by Food Lion as its employees). The case is one of several 
that have cast doubt on some uses of deception and hidden cameras. 
Nonetheless, Reali-TV is still with us and is not likely to go away. 
Television broadcasters now must compete .with cable channels by airing 
new series all year round. The return of labor-management strife in Hol-
lywood, including the 2007-2008 Writers Guild of America strike, has 
recently sparked a resurgence of reality programming. As long as the net-
works' desperately need to fill the hours around expensive dramas and sit-
coms with cheaper programming, to offer new fare throughout the year, 
to sell in international markets, and to control labor, they will provide us 
with their peculiar brand of reality. 
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